From the TCU to the UN: Reflections on Public Governance at a Global Scale

By Ana Paula Sampaio Silva Pereira

Deputy General Secretariat for Auditing International Organizations

 

From the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) to the United Nations Board of Auditors. From the Brazilian political system to the world’s most important international organization. What connects and what distinguishes these realities, especially when we think about public sector governance?

It has been a fascinating experience to dive into this universe after spending the last few years observing the TCU internally, as an organization, and externally, as part of the Brazilian political system. It is inevitable to draw comparisons and parallels, either to understand this new, complex world we are facing, or simply out of the habit of reflecting on what could be improved at the TCU and in Brazil. 

It is interesting to observe, for instance, how everything at the UN is more bureaucratic, filled with layers, rules, and protocols that at first may seem excessive. But, over time, we begin to realize that many of these layers, rules, and protocols serve a purpose and are crucial in preventing misunderstandings that could lead to significant problems.

When it comes to the segregation of duties, preventing concentration of power, and ensuring that all actors are subject to oversight, it is hard to find anything comparable. From what I have been able to observe so far, everyone here is subject to multiple layers of oversight. The administration is overseen by internal and government  audit, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and still must provide public explanations to the General Assembly (the UN’s highest political body, composed of member states, with a role similar to that of Brazil’s National Congress) regarding all findings identified in audit reports and recommendations not implemented. 

Quality

As auditors, we are frequently questioned by the administration about every step, procedure, and stage of the audit process; by the executive committees of each entity; by the audit committees of each entity; by the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies. And if the administration does not implement our recommendations, we too are held accountable. Not to mention France and China, who meticulously review our reports to ensure their quality, consistency, and alignment with the Board’s position.

What we observe is that the UN’s governance structures are, in general, more robust than those we know at the national level. This robustness seems essential to cope with the complexity of a multilateral organization composed of 193 sovereign countries. It is unique and distinctive, yet it shares many similarities with the challenges we face in Brazil, offering opportunities for intriguing comparisons.

The approval process for the financial statements of UN agencies adheres to a predefined schedule, ensuring that the evaluation is consistently finalized by the end of the subsequent year. In contrast, Brazil lacks a similar procedure, which has enabled the National Congress to go years without addressing the annual accounts submitted by the President of the Republic. 

Representation

Another noteworthy example is the policy in place here that seeks to ensure balanced representation of member states, both within the UN staff and in the contracts it awards. In essence, this goes beyond political representation, as seen in Brazil's National Congress, aiming instead for equilibrium within administrative structures and in the distribution of resources through contracts. Drawing a parallel with Brazil, it would be akin to ensuring balanced regional representation among federal civil servants and in federal public procurement.

One striking aspect is that, while the Board of Auditors does not possess the coercive power we have in Brazil, the monitoring of recommendations carries significant weight at the UN. No recommendation is lost or forgotten over time. In each audit cycle, all outstanding recommendations are monitored, and the results are included in each annual audit report. Moreover, each year, during meetings of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly and the Executive Committees, this becomes one of the most closely scrutinized issues by member states, before whom managers are required to publicly justify their actions.

It is no coincidence that the process of formulating findings and recommendations is so different from the reality we experience in Brazil. At the UN, it is crucial to convince the auditee of the importance of our recommendation, as accepted recommendations carry much more weight. After all, it is challenging to justify the failure to implement something the manager themselves have acknowledged as relevant. In this process of persuasion, it is very important to listen attentively, understand the manager’s circumstances, and craft recommendations that are both practical and genuinely contribute to improving their reality.

Communication

When it comes to dialogue, one key lesson we’ve learned from the UN is that as systems become more complex, effective communication becomes increasingly critical and sensitive. Perhaps this will be one of the legacies that this experience brings to public auditing in Brazil: enhancing our ability to communicate. This element, with the growing evolution and democratization of communication methods, is essential for the survival of any organization.

These initial months with the UN Board of Auditors already demonstrate that Brazil stands to gain significantly from this experience of auditing international organizations, bringing back valuable best practices and governance models that promote efficiency, integrity, and effectiveness in public administration.